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CRIMINAL LAW-Home Alone: Why House Arrest
Doesn't Qualify for Presentence Confinement Credit in
New Mexico-State v. Fellhauer
I. INTRODUCTION
In State v. Fellhauer,' the New Mexico Court of Appeals held that house arrest
does not constitute "official confinement" within the meaning of the New Mexico
presentence confinement credit statute.2 Consequently, persons under house arrest
are not entitled to presentence confinement credit This is a case of first impression
in New Mexico.
Despite its innocuous appearance, the decision in Fellhauer may have a
significant deleterious consequence. Specifically, the chronic and potentially illegal
overcrowding at the Bemalillo County Detention Center may be further exacerbated
convicted criminals to spend more time actually incarcerby the decision, causing
4
facility.
that
in
ated
This Note will discuss the factual and procedural history of Fellhauer, the
development of presentence confinement credit law in New Mexico, the current
state of that law in New Mexico and other jurisdictions, the rationale of the court
of appeals in deciding the case, and the implications of that decision.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE5
Frank Fellhauer (defendant) was indicted on six counts of first degree criminal
sexual penetration 6 and three counts of third degree criminal sexual contact of a
minor.7 He was arrested on a bench warrant and incarcerated on May 20, 1992. Bail
was set at $50,000, but the defendant was unable to raise the money or post a bond.
Consequently, he remained in the custody of the Bemalillo County Detention
Center (BCDC) until August 5, 1992, at which time the district court entered an
order releasing him to the custody of a relative. This release order placed the
defendant under house arrest, forbade him from leaving Bernalillo County, and
obligated him to notify his attorney of his whereabouts and any change in his home
or work address. Additionally, the order subjected the defendant to random
checking of his residence and general supervision by Bemalillo County Pretrial
Services and denied him any contact with children.
On October 30, 1992, the defendant entered a plea of no contest to two counts
of attempted first-degree criminal sexual penetration and three counts of third-

1.
2.
3.
4.

123 N.M. 476, 943 P.2d 123 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 123 N.M. 446,942 P.2d 189 (1997).
See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20-12 (Repl. Pamp. 1994).
See Fellhauer, 123 N.M. at 481, 943 P.2d at 128.
Briefly stated, the Bernalillo County Detention Center (BCDC) is under a federal order to correct

overcrowding by keeping its inmate population under 643, and will face fines and liability for civil rights violations
if it exceeds this limit. See discussion infra Part VL The Fellhauer nule is likely to result inprisoners serving longer
sentences at BCDC, thereby increasing the inmate population and exacerbating the overcrowding.
5. Unless otherwise indicated, the facts contained inthis section are paraphrased from Fellhauer, 123 N.M.
at 477, 943 P.2d at 124.
6. Fellhauer was charged with violating N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11(A) (1994 Repl. Pamp. &Supp. 1997).
See Fellhauer, 123 N.M. at 477, 943 P.2d at 124.
7. See Fellhauer, 123 N.M. at 477, 943 P.2d at 124. Third degree criminal sexual contact of a minor is
proscribed by N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-13(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1994).
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degree criminal sexual contact of a minor. The court sentenced him to a term of nine
years and granted him a presentence confinement credit of seventy-eight days,
representing the time he spent in BCDC prior to his release to house arrest.
On June 16, 1995, the defendant filed a pro se motion seeking to correct the
judgment to allow him presentence confinement credit for the time he spent under
house arrest. Following a non-evidentiary hearing, at which the defendant was
represented by a public defender, the district court denied his motion on two
grounds. 8 First, the district court noted that the confinement was at a private home
and not at a place controlled by the State through correctional officers, and thus was
not sufficiently jail-like to warrant granting presentence confinement credit.9
Second, the district court interpreted its August 1992 order literally, noting that it
was an order of release and not of confinement or custody.10
The defendant appealed the denial of his motion to the New Mexico Court of
Appeals." In an opinion delivered on June 4, 1997, the court of appeals upheld the
decision of the district court and denied the defendant presentence confinement
credit for the time he spent under house arrest. 2 The defendant applied to the New
Mexico Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari on June 24, 1997.'3 The writ was
denied on July 24, 1997.14
Ill. BACKGROUND
This section will examine the presentence confinement credit law of New
Mexico and other jurisdictions, including federal law. Following this examination
is a brief discussion of how New Mexico presentence confinement credit law
comports with that of other jurisdictions and the interplay between New Mexico law
and the law of other jurisdictions.
A. New Mexico Presentence Confinement Credit Law Before Fellhauer
Presentence confinement credit law is largely undeveloped in New Mexico, with
a single statute and a handful of cases constituting the body of information available
on the subject. The New Mexico presentence confinement credit statute (PCC
statute) states that "[a] person held in official confinement on suspicion or charges
of the commission of a felony shall, upon conviction of that or a lesser included
offense, be given credit for the period spent in presentence confinement against any
sentence finally imposed for that offense."' 5 This statute has remained unaltered
since its inception in 196716 and contains no definition of its key operational term

8. See Fellhauer,123 N.M. at 477,943 P.2d at 124.

9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See Defendant-Appellant's Brief in Chief at 1, State v. Fellhauer, 123 N.M. 476, 943 P.2d 123 (Ct.
App.) (No. 16,773), cert. denied, 123 N.M. 446, 942 P.2d 189 (1997).
12. See Fellhauer,123 N.M. at 477, 943 P.2d at 123.
13. See Defendant-Appellant's Brief in Chief at 1, Fellhauer,123 N.M. 476, 943 P.2d 123 (Ct. App. 1997)
(No. 16,773).
14. See State v. Fellhauer, 123 N.M. 446, 942 P.2d 189 (1997) (table).
15. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20-12 (Repl. Pamp. 1994).
16. The presentence confinement credit law was codified originally as N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-29-25 (Repl.
Vol. 1972) prior to the 1978 recompilation.
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"official confinement." This deficiency has created the bulk of litigation about the
7
statute and was the focus of the court's analysis in Fellhauer
State v. LaBadie"8 was the first case about the meaning of "official confinement"
as it appears in the PCC statute. In LaBadie, the New Mexico Court of Appeals
addressed the question of whether a defendant was in "official confinement" and
thus eligible for presentence confinement credit under the PCC statute, for time
spent in a state psychiatric hospital where he had been committed after being found
incompetent to stand trial. 9 Relying almost solely on the facts of the case, the
LaBadie court determined that the defendant was under "official confinement"
within the meaning of the PCC statute, because he was continually under maximum
security conditions and was to be held by the psychiatric hospital until the hospital
2
received a written order from the court. " This decision had the practical effect of
beyond the
expanding the scope of "official confinement" within the PCC statute
2
'
institution.
correctional
traditional
other
or
prison
four walls of a
The next significant New Mexico case discussing the meaning of "official
confinement" was State v. Watchman,2 2 where the defendant asserted that he was
entitled to presentence confinement credit for time spent in a traditional medical
hospital recuperating from injuries sustained during a crash of a vehicle he was
operating while intoxicated.23 The defendant argued that a blood sample was taken
from him by police officers while he was unconscious, which is impermissible
that if he was under
unless the defendant is under arrest.24 The defendant asserted
25 The court of appeals
credit.
confinement
arrest, he should be granted presentence
remanded the case for lack of an adequate factual record, but indicated that it would
have accepted such a situation as "official confinement" if the defendant had been
under arrest and the hospital had a duty to call the police if the defendant left the
hospital. 26 This decision had the practical effect of reinforcing the LaBadie
decision.27
28
A third decision that merits a brief discussion is State v. Howard. In Howard,
the New Mexico Court of Appeals determined that the purpose behind the PCC
statute was "to give some relief to persons who, because of an inability to obtain
17. This Note does not mean to suggest that the other presentence confinement cases are unworthy of
discussion. They are simply irrelevant to the question of what constitutes "official confinement," which is the focus
of Fellhauer.Two cases that do not discuss "official confinement" are worth mentioning, however. In State v.
Baca, 87 N.M. 495, 496, 535 P.2d 1346, 1347 (Ct. App. 1975), the court of appeals held that presentence
confinement credit is to be given against any sentence, regardless of length. In State v. Ramzy, 98 N.M. 436, 437,
649 P.2d 504, 505 (Ct. App. 1982), the court of appeals held that the language of the PCC statute was mandatory.
18. 87 N.M. 391, 534 P.2d 483 (Ct. App. 1975).
19. See id. at 392, 534 P.2d at 484.
20. See id. at 392-93, 534 P.2d at 484-85.
21. See State v. Fellhauer, 123 N.M. 476,479,943 P.2d 123, 126, (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 123 N.M. 446,
942 P.2d 189 (1997).
22. 111 N.M. 727, 809 P.2d 641 (Ct. App.), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hosteen, 122 N.M.
228, 923 P.2d 595 (Ct. App. 1996).
at 734, 809 P.2d at 648.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 735, 809 P.2d at 649.
27. See State v. Fellhauer, 123 N.M. 476,479, 943 P.2d 123, 126 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 123 N.M. 446,
942 P.2d 189 (1997).
28. 108 N.M. 560, 775 P.2d 762 (Ct. App. 1989).
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.bail, are held in custody. 29 Although this determination was based solely on an
analysis contained in a Massachusetts case,3" it has remained unchallenged.
B. Presentence Confinement CreditLaw in Other Jurisdictions
The law of presentence confinement credit in other jurisdictions is widely varied,
but appears to follow three general patterns. In the first pattern group (Group One)
are jurisdictions that explicitly require detention in a prison or jail facility as a
precursor to granting presentence confinement credit. The second group of
jurisdictions (Group Two) is at the other end of the spectrum. In Group Two, house
arrest and other non-penal forms of confinement such as drug and alcohol treatment
centers are recognized as "official confinement" for the purposes of granting
presentence confinement credit, provided there are sufficient restrictions on the
prisoner's liberty. The third group of jurisdictions (Group Three) falls somewhere
in between, neither explicitly requiring detention in a jail or prison facility, nor
allowing house arrest to qualify as "official confinement" for presentence
confinement credit.
Group One is composed of four states 3 and the federal penal system. Michigan
has an explicit correctional facility detention requirement set forth in its presentence
confinement credit statute.3 2 In People v. Scott,3 3 the Michigan Court of Appeals
determined that a defendant in a drug rehabilitation program was not entitled to
presentence confinement credit because he was not "in jail" as required by
Michigan's presentence confinement credit statute.34 Arizona has made the same
explicit correctional facility detention requirement determination in case law. In
State v. Reynolds,35 the Supreme Court of Arizona determined that the language of
its presentence confinement credit statute36 required that official confinement be
defined as "incarceration in a jail or prison and not merely ... the substantial
restraint of freedom which is commensurate with an arrest or detention. 3 7 Idaho
also adopted this same position in State v. Climer,35 when the Idaho Court of
Appeals explicitly stated that official confinement or "incarceration means to
confine in a prison or jail., 39 Florida follows a similar rule, exemplified in Shmuel
v. State,' where the court refused to grant presentence confinement credit to a
29. Id. at 562, 775 P.2d at 764.
30. See Commonwealth v. Carter, 411 N.E.2d 184 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980). One might question the
appropriateness of using Massachusetts case law for guidance on the meaning of New Mexico's PCC statute,
because the Massachusetts PCC statute contains entirely different language than the New Mexico PCC statute.
Specifically, the Massachusetts statute provides that "the court, in imposing a sentence ... shall order that the
prisoner be deemed to have served a portion of such sentence.., in confinement.., awaiting and during trial."
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 279, § 33A (West 1997).
31. These four states are Michigan, Arizona, Idaho, and Florida.
32. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 769.1 lb (West 1996).
33. 548 N.W.2d 678 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
34. See id. at 680. See also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 769.1 lb (West 1996).
35. 823 P.2d 681 (Ariz. 1992) (en banc).
36. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-709(B) (West 1989). The statute provides that "[aIll time spent in
custody ... until the prisoner is sentened ... shall be credited against the term of imprisonment[.]" Id.
37. Reynolds, 823 P.2d at 683.
38. 896 P.2d 346 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995).
39. Id. at 349.
40. 691 So.2d 1149 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
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defendant for his stay in a private psychiatric hospital, but granted him credit for
4
time spent in a state hospital that served as the medical ward for the county jail.
The federal penal system is another example of a prison-only jurisdiction, where
presentence confinement is granted only to persons under control of the Bureau of
Prisons.42
Group Two consists of six states.43 These states focus more on the restrictions of
a prisoner's liberty than the place of confinement for granting presentence
45
confinement credit.44 New Jersey espoused this position in State v. Reyes, where
the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, held that in order to secure
presentence confinement credit, a detainee needs to show that his confinement was
so restrictive as to be "substantially equivalent to custody in a jail or in a state
47
hospital."' Maryland utilized this same principle in Dedo v. State, when the court
held that a defendant placed in house arrest under the custody of the warden of a
county detention center, and subject to an escape charge for violation of the terms
of his house arrest, was in the constructive custody of the state and thus entitled to
presentence confinement credit." Wyoming took a similar approach in Yellowbear
v. State,4 where the Wyoming Supreme Court declared that persons in residential
alcohol treatment facilities are entitled to presentence confinement credit if their
freedom of movement and freedom from search are restricted, and they are charged
with felony escape if they leave the facility.5' Vermont granted presentence
confinement credit in In re McPhee5 to a defendant who spent time in a residential
alcohol treatment facility.52 The court reasoned that he was in official custody
because his freedom had been restricted and he was subject to reimprisonment if he
left the facility without permission.53 Nevada utilized this same principle in Grant
v. State,' when it determined that some residential drug treatment programs restrain
the liberty of a patient so much that residence in such a program is equivalent to

41. See id. at 1150.
42. See, e.g., Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50 (1995) (holding that federal detainee, not directly under control
of Bureau of Prisons, was not entitled to presentence confinement credit).
43. These states are New Jersey, Maryland, Wyoming, Vermont, Nevada, and Alaska.
44. The author of this Note is tempted to label Group Two as the "majority rule." However, this would be
unwise for three reasons. First, only thirteen states (excluding New Mexico) and the federal government have
decided the question of what constitutes official confinement for the purposes of granting presentence confinement
credit. Group Two contains only six of these states, which is not a numerical majority. It could easily be said that
non-Group Two approaches constitute a majority. Second, as alternatives to conventional correctional facility
detention are explored by more states, and more rulings on this issue are consequently made, Group Two could
quickly find itself in the minority. Third, labeling Group Two as a majority diminishes the importance of the
approach followed by the five jurisdictions in Group One.
45. 504 A.2d 43 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 511 A.2d 671 (1986).
46. Id. at 52. The holding of Reyes was subsequently modified by New Jersey's Comprehensive Drug
Reform Act of 1986, which provided that a defendant in a residential drug treatment program was entitled to
presentence confinement credit. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-14(d) (West 1987).
47. 680 A.2d 464 (Md. Ct. App. 1996).
48. See id. at 468-70.
49. 874 P.2d 241 (Wyo. 1994).
50. See id. at 245-46.
51. 442 A.2d 1285 (Vt. 1982).
52. See id.at 1287-88.
53. See id. at 1287.
54. 659 P.2d 878 (Nev. 1983).
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incarceration in a jail.55 Alaska follows the rule that defendants in alcohol treatment
programs qualify for presentence confinement credit if they are subjected to
substantial restraints on their freedom of movement and behavior, which is
exemplified in Nygren v. State.56
Group Three contains three states57 that do not explicitly require detention in a
prison facility to grant presentence confinement credit, but do not recognize house
arrest as official confinement. California indicated in People v. Reinertson58 that
"'custody' is to be broadly defined ... [, but] the concept of custody generally
connotes a facility rather than a home. It includes some aspect of regulation of
behavior... [and] supervision in a structured life style." 59 Illinois addressed this
issue in the context of house arrest as a condition of being released on bond in
People v. Ramos, . where the court held that house arrest was not sufficient to
warrant presentence confinement credit.6' Most notably, the Ramos court held that
"[h]ome confinement, though restrictive, differs in several important respects from
confinement in a jail or prison. [For example,] [a]n offender who is detained at
home is not subject to the regimentation of penal institutions and . . . enjoys
unrestricted freedom of activity, movement, and association.,,62 However, the
Ramos court noted that presentence confinement credit had been granted previously
for confinement in non-penal institutions.63 Wisconsin followed the same principle
in State v. Pettis64 when it held that a defendant under house detention was not
entitled to presentence confinement credit because he was not locked in his house
or otherwise physically confined, and was not subject to the control of an institution
or a state officer of that institution.65
C. Interplay Between New Mexico and Other Jurisdictions
Prior to the decision in Fellhauer,it appears that the New Mexico presentence
confinement credit law would have been classified in Group Two by default. New
Mexico law could not be placed in Group One, which requires detention in an
actual penal facility, because State v. LaBadie6 definitively stated that the New
Mexico PCC statute does not require a prisoner to be detained in an official
correctional facility to be held in "official confinement" within the meaning of the

55. See id. at 879.
56. 658 P.2d 141 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
57. These states are California, Illinois, and Wisconsin.

58. 223 Cal. Rptr. 670 (Ct. App. 1986).
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 674.
561 N.E.2d 643 (Ill.
1990).
See id. at 648.
Id. at 647.

63. See id. at 648.
64. 441 N.W.2d 247 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
65. See id. at 249. In fact, Wisconsin's determination of whether a person in a non-penal institution is in
official confinement for the purposes of granting presentence confinement credit may be as simple as determining
whether the defendant is locked in at night. See id.
66. 87 N.M. 391, 534 P.2d 483 (Ct. App. 1975).
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PCC statute.67 It also could not have been placed in Group Three, because the
question of house arrest qualifying as "official confinement" had never been
addressed and explicitly declined. Therefore, Group Two seemed to be the most
appropriate classification, because house arrest as "official confinement" was still
an open issue.
As a caveat, however, it should be noted that any attempt to interpret the New
Mexico PCC statute by comparison with other jurisdictions' PCC statutes will
encounter difficulty, because a majority of the PCC statutes of other jurisdictions
contain language markedly different from that in the New Mexico PCC statute. For
example, the Arizona PCC statute provides that "[a]ll time spent in custody ... until
'
the prisoner is sentenced... shall be credited against the term of imprisonment[. "
In marked contrast, the New Mexico PCC statute provides that "[a] person held in
official confinement... shall ... be given credit for the period spent in presentence
69
confinement against any sentence finally imposed[.]"
IV. RATIONALE
arrest constitutes "official confinement" for the
house
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obstacle the court had to overcome was finding a definition for "official confinement," which is the key phrase that triggers the operation of the statute and the
granting of presentence confinement credit.72
By examining the meaning of "official confinement," the Fellhauercourt found
that there was no plain meaning of this phrase.73 The court was also unable to find
guidance in legislative history, because there was "precious little in . . . the
circumstances surrounding [the statute's] enactment, from which [the court] can
draw any definitive conclusion as to how... the statute should be applied to factual
'74
circumstances such as those [as the court had before it]." However, the Fellhauer
court did have two sources of possible definitions for "official confinement." One
67. See id. at 393, 534 P.2d at 485. See also State v. Watchman, III N.M. 727, 734, 809 P.2d 641,648
(Ct. App.), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hosteen, 122 N.M. 228, 923 P.2d 595 (Ct. App. 1996).
68. ARJZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-709(B) (West 1989).
69. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20-12 (Repl. Pamp. 1994).
70. See id.
71. Id.
72. See State v. Fellhauer, 123 N.M. 476, 478, 943 P.2d 123, 125 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 123 N.M. 446,
942 P.2d 189 (1997).
73. See id.
74. Id. The New Mexico legislature typically does not maintain a record of legislative history of statutes.
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was other New Mexico statutes containing similar language and the other was New
Mexico case law interpreting the PCC statute.75
Prior to delving into a full-scale statutory examination, the Fellhauer court
indicated that it considered "official confinement" to be closely related, if not
functionally equivalent, to the term "lawful custody or confinement., 76 The term
"official confinement" is used primarily in the New Mexico escape statutes 77 and
is defined in the definitions section of the New Mexico criminal statutes 7 as "the
holding of any person pursuant to lawful authority, including, without limitation,
actual or constructive custody of prisoners temporarily outside a penal institution,
reformatory, jail, prison farm, or ranch... ,7' The Fellhauercourt was persuaded
that this definition meant that a person could be in "official confinement" outside
of a jail or other institution controlled by police or correctional officers.8 0 However,
the court indicated that none of these statutory provisions contained any specific
guidance about the degree of limitation of freedom necessary to find that a person
is in "official confinement" even though not in prison or jail."' Consequently, they
were of little help in answering the question before the court.
The Fellhauercourt then moved on to examine New Mexico case law to aid in
its interpretation of the statute. With very little New Mexico case law on the issue,
this was necessarily a short analysis, beginning with State v. LaBadie."2 The
Fellhauer court recognized that LaBadie effectively dispelled the notion that
confinement in an official penal facility was necessary to meet the definition of
"official confinement," which was reinforced by the Fellhauercourt's analysis
of
State v. Watchman. 3 These two cases, while somewhat illuminating, did not provide
any "specific guidance" for the Fellhauercourt in determining the meaning of
"official confinement. 84
An analysis of a third case, State v. Howard, 5 enabled the Fellhauercourt to
determine the purpose of the PCC statute, which was to "give some relief to persons
who, because of an inability to obtain bail, are held in custody."86 Because the
defendant in Fellhauerwas not in jail following his release, the court noted that the
purpose of the PCC statute would be served by granting presentence confinement
credit only if the conditions of a defendant's release were sufficiently onerous to be
analogous to those encountered during confinement in an actual penal facility. 7
75. See id. at 478, 943 P.2d at 125.
76. See id.
77. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-22-7 to -19 (Repl. Pamp. 1994 & Supp. 1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-2-46
(Repl. Pamp. 1994).
78. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-1-12(H) (Repl. Pamp. 1994).
79. Id.
80. See State v. Fellhauer, 123 N.M. 476,478,943 P.2d 123, 125, (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 123, N.M. 446,
942 P.2d 189 (1997).
81. See id. at 478-79, 943 P.2dat 125-26.
82. 87 N.M. 391, 534 P.2d 483 (Ct. App. 1975).
83. 111 N.M. 727, 809 P.2d 641 (Ct. App.), overruledon othergrounds by State v. Hosteen, 122 N.M. 228,
923 P.2d 595 (Ct. App. 1996).
84. See Fellhauer, 123 N.M. at 479, 943 P.2d at 126.
85. 108 N.M. 560, 775 P.2d 762 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 108 N.M. 433,733 P.2d 1240 (1989).
86. Fellhauer,123 N.M. at 479,943 P.2d at 126 (quoting State v. Howard, 108 N.M. 560, 562, 775 P.2d
762, 764 (Ct. App. 1989)).
87. See id.
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This convinced the Fellhauercourt to roughly define the term "official confinement" in the PCC statute as any detention sufficiently restrictive of a prisoner's
liberties.88
Instead of immediately examining the defendant's house arrest conditions to see
if they met this rough definition of "official confinement," the Fellhauercourt next
undertook an analysis of presentence confinement credit law9from other jurisdic9
tions. The first cases the court looked at were State v. Climer," People v. Ramos, 0
State v. Reynolds,91 State v. Pettis,' and People v. Reinertson.93 The Fellhauercourt
summarized these cases as determining that house arrest was generally not as
restrictive as confinement in a penal facility and thus did not qualify as "official94
confinement" for the purposes of granting presentence confinement credit.
Specifically, the Fellhauercourt was persuaded to adopt this viewpoint because
prisoners under house arrest are not "subject to the [same] regimentation of penal
institutions ... ,enjoy[] unrestricted freedom of activity, movement, and association[,].. .[and do] not suffer the same surveillance and lack of privacy [found in
penal institutions]." '
Next, the Fellhauer court examined a second set of cases, Dedo v. State,"
Yellowbear v. State,' Nygren v. State,9 Grantv. State,99 State v. Reyes,"° and In re
McPhee.' These six cases illustrate the approach of the Group Two jurisdictions,
in which courts examine the restrictions on a prisoner's liberty to determine if
"official confinement" exists. All six were explained away as instances where the
house arrest in question imposed conditions sufficiently onerous to qualify as
"official confinement."" However, the Fellhauercourt noted that three of these
cases, Dedo, Yellowbear, and Reyes, imposed a felony escape charge on prisoners
in non-penal facilities, and concluded that such an escape
charge was an onerous
03
condition within the meaning of "official confinement."'
The Fellhauercourt then turned its attention to Reno v. Koray, °4 and quickly
concluded that because Koray was based so heavily on a separate set of federal
statutes, it would be of little help in interpreting New Mexico law. 5 Nevertheless,
the court determined that Koray was somewhat useful, because it indicated that the
88. See id.
89. 896 P.2d 346 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995).
90. 561 N.E.2d 643 (I1. 1990).
91. 823 P.2d 681 (Ariz. 1992).
92. 441 N.W.2d 247 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
93. 223 Cal. Rptr. 670 (Ct. App. 1986).
94. See State v. Fellhauer, 123 N.M. 476, 479, 943 P.2d 123, 126 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 123 N.M. 446,
942 P.2d 189 (1997).
95. Id. at 480, 943 P.2d at 127 (quoting People v. Ramos, 561 N.E.2d, 643, 647 (111.1990)).
96. 680 A.2d 464 (Md. Ct. App. 1996).
97. 874 P.2d 241 (Wyo. 1994).
98. 658 P.2d 141 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
99. 659 P.2d 878 (Nev. 1983).
100. 504 A.2d 43 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986).
101. 442 A.2d 1285 (Vt. 1982).
102. See State v. Fellhauer, 123 N.M. 476, 480,943 P.2d 123, 127 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 123 N.M. 446,
942 P.2d 189 (1997).
103. See id.
104. 515 U.S. 50 (1995).
105. See Fellhauer, 123 N.M. at 480, 943 P.2d at 127.
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Supreme Court felt that the identity of a prisoner's custodian was "significant as a
measure of the restrictions placed on the defendant's liberty and movement." 1"
However, the Fellhauercourt was reluctant to adopt a bright-line test regarding the
identity of the custodian, because it would preclude New Mexico courts from their
traditional pursuit of inquiries into the specific facts of the case for determination
of official confinement. 017
Thus armed with several key principles from its analysis, the Fellhauercourt was
prepared to make a ruling on the fate of the defendant. The court held that detention
"outside a jail, prison or other adult or juvenile correctional facility"' ' qualifies as
"official confinement" within the meaning of the PCC statute,
when (1) a court has entered an order releasing the defendant from a facility but
has imposed limitations on the defendant's freedom of movement, OR the
defendant is in the actual or constructive custody of state or local law enforcement or correctional officers; and (2) the defendant is punishable for a crime of
escape if there is an unauthorized departure from the place of confinement or
other non-compliance with the court's order."
The court then determined that the particular conditions of the defendant's house
arrest did not bring him within the ambit of "official confinement" as defined by the
new test."' First, the Fellhauercourt noted that the defendant was not in the actual
or constructive custody of law enforcement officers."' Second, and according to the
court, "more telling," was the fact that the defendant was not subject to a charge of
escape if he violated the terms of his house arrest." 2 Although the Fellhauercourt
admitted that the defendant's release could have been conditioned on the penalty
of such a charge under the New Mexico escape statutes," 3 the court was careful to
note that the presence of such a penalty by itself was not enough to warrant a
finding of "official confinement. '""4
The Fellhauercourt never reached the question of whether it considered the
restrictions on the defendant's liberty sufficient to warrant a finding of "official
confinement." This seemingly crucial step was avoided because the defendant in
Fellhauerwas not subject to an escape charge, which is an absolute requirement for
a finding of "official confinement" under the new test that the Fellhauercourt
promulgated. Thus, the Fellhauer approach allows subsequent courts to avoid
individualized factual analysis of whether conditions are sufficiently onerous to
constitute official confinement if the defendant's release is not conditioned on
formal escape charges.

106.
107.
108.
109.

See id. (citing Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 62-64 (1995)).
See id. at 481, 943 P.2d at 128.
Id.
Id.

110. See id.

111. See id.
112. Seeid.
113. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-22-7 to -19 (Repl. Pamp. 1994 & Supp. 1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-2-46
(Repl. Pamp. 1994). These statutes generally provide for varying degrees of felony charges for escape from different
penal confinement settings.
114. See State v. Fellhauer, 123 N.M. 476,481,943 P.2d 123, 128 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 123 N.M. 446,
942 P.2d 189 (1997).
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V. ANALYSIS
In contrast to the above section, which detailed how the Fellhauercourt reached
a decision, this section will examine why the Fellhauercourt reached that decision.
The first step of this discussion will be an examination of the reasons behind the
particular construction the court chose for the new presentence confinement credit
rule. Following this, the new test itself will be critiqued, which will reveal it to be
unworkable" 5 and inadequately reflective of the potential restrictions on a
prisoner's liberty that may indicate "official confinement" within the meaning of
the PCC statute.
In constructing the new Fellhauerpresentence confinement credit rule, the New
Mexico Court of Appeals had two concerns. First, the court was confronted with a
conflict between the desire to maintain and follow existing New Mexico jurisprudence concerning presentence confinement credit and the powerful influence of
tests adopted by other jurisdictions with more fully developed presentence
confinement credit law. t" 6 In particular, the New Mexico tradition of allowing
courts to engage in factual inquiries in a particular case was at odds with the
seductive, bright-line reasoning of the Group One jurisdictions, which determined
"official confinement" based upon the identity of a prisoner's custodian." 7
To resolve this conflict, the court developed a compromise between the two
approaches, which is reflected in the first clause of the test."' The initial subsection
of the clause allows a court to engage in a factual inquiry and determine whether the
restrictions placed on a prisoner's liberty are sufficient to warrant a finding that he
was officially confined. This reflects the traditional New Mexico approach. The
second subsection of the first clause allows a court to bypass this factual examination and make a finding of official confinement if the custodian is a correctional
officer," 9 reflecting the Group One approach.
A second concern of the court in fashioning the Fellhauerrule was what to do
with the jurisdictions that employed a felony escape charge analysis in determining
"official confinement."' t2 The court apparently determined that this was an
important and relevant factor in the inquiry, and incorporated it into the second
clause of the Fellhauertest, which makes an escape charge a requirement of a
finding of "official confinement.'' Thus, the court established a bright-line test for
determining whether or not a prisoner is entitled to presentence confinement credit.
As constructed, the Fellhauerrule allows a prisoner to demonstrate that he was
under "official confinement" for purposes of the PCC statute, first, by showing
either the existence of a sufficient restriction on his personal liberties or that he was

115. For the purposes of this discussion, "unworkable" is not used in the traditional sense. It is used for lack
of a better adjective to describe the rule's emphasis on the presence of an escape charge in a defendant's release
order, at the expense of the traditional, fact-based inquiry that the rule was designed to protect.
116. See Fellhauer,123 N.M. at 481, 943 P.2d at 128.
117. See Part UI.B. supra for a discussion on the presentence confinement credit policy of Group One
jurisdictions.
118. See Fellhauer,123 N.M. at 481, 943 P.2d at 128.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 480, 943 P.2d at 127.
121. See id. at 481, 943 P.2d at 128.
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in the custody of a correction official. Second, he must show that he was punishable
with a charge of escape for violation of the terms of his incarceration. It is difficult
to find much fault with the court's analysis. At first glance, this rule appears to be
an astute attempt to reconcile the judicial approaches to presentence confinement
credit law among the various jurisdictions.
However sage the court's reasoning in adopting the Fellhauerrule, the rule is
essentially flawed, which becomes apparent upon closer inspection. The rule, while
attractive, is simply unworkable because it does not allow New Mexico courts the
flexibility to pursue case-specific inquiries into the circumstances of the confinement. It does not adequately consider the number of potential restrictions on a
prisoner's liberty that might sufficiently indicate "official confinement" within the
meaning of the PCC statute. Instead, it relies on whether the judge ordering
confinement has the foresight to include in the order a potential escape charge for
violating the terms of confinement.
The essential difficulty of the°Fellhauerrule stems from the escape charge
provision. As constructed, the second clause treats the potential of an escape charge
as a separate, overriding element of the test rather than a factor to be considered in
evaluating the restraint on a prisoner's liberty. If there is no potential charge of
escape for violation of the terms of the release, the defendant is not in "official
confinement," and consequently not entitled to presentence confinement credit.'
In devising this rule, the Fellhauercourt failed to give adequate weight to the fact
that in the jurisdictions in which an escape charge clause was important to a court's
presentence confinement credit inquiry, the presence of such a clause was not a
determinative element, but rather one of a number of restrictions on a prisoner's
liberty.' To put it more plainly, in those jurisdictions, the presence of an escape
charge clause was only evidence that increased the likelihood that presentence
confinement credit was warranted.
The Fellhauercourt was certainly entitled to treat the possibility of an escape
charge however it chose. But, in construing it as a separate and overriding element,
the court created a rule that essentially subsumes any additional inquiry into the
restrictions on a prisoner's liberty. To demonstrate this proposition and show how
the rule is superfluous, it is helpful to attempt to apply the rule to a hypothetical
situation involving Prisoner X.
The first subsection of the first clause would require Prisoner X to demonstrate
that there were sufficient restrictions on her liberty to warrant presentence
confinement credit or to show that she was in the custody of a penal official. It will
be assumed that she is under non-penal detention, and can demonstrate sufficient
restrictions. Prisoner X must then overcome the separate hurdle of showing that an
escape charge provision in her release order operated as an additional restriction of

122. See id.
123. See, e.g., Dedo v. State, 680 A.2d 464, 469 (Md. Ct. App. 1996) (recognizing potential felony escape
charge for violation of terms of house arrest as a restriction on a prisoner's liberty); State v. Reyes, 504 A.2d 43,
52 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) (deeming potential felony escape charge for violation of terms of release as
a restriction on a prisoner's liberty); Yellowbear v. State, 874 P.2d 241, 246 (Wyo. 1994) (recognizing potential
felony escape charge for noncompliance with terms of residential alcohol treatment program as a restriction on
participant's liberty).
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her liberty, even though she has already demonstrated that her liberty was
sufficiently restricted to constitute "official confinement." The second clause thus
necessarily imposes a bright-line test on whether she was officially confined,
meaning that any other restrictions on her liberty, examined under the first clause,
are essentially irrelevant. Any factually based inquiry into the conditions of her
confinement is thus meaningless. This is precisely what the court was seeking to
avoid with the Fellhauerrule, when it stated that it was trying to preserve a New
about presentence confinement
Mexico court's ability to make a determination
24
credit based on the facts of the case.
By itself, this logical inconsistency does not show that the rule is superfluous, but
rather that it does not accurately reflect what the court was trying to accomplish.
However, when coupled with the fact that New Mexico law allows, but does not
1 25
require, non-penal confinement orders to carry such an escape charge provision,
it becomes apparent that the conditions of the rule cannot be satisfied. Defendants
are placed in the position of trying to prove sufficient restrictions on their liberty
to earn presentence confinement credit, and then necessarily failing on the escape
charge clause. Accordingly, no person confined outside a penal facility will ever be
entitled to presentence confinement credit, unless a law is enacted to require escape
charge provisions to be attached to non-penal confinement orders, or judges have
the independent foresight to put potential escape charges in the release orders.
Even if such a law is enacted, and escape charge provisions are included in nonpenal release orders, the Fellhauerrule would still be flawed, because it does not
take into account many restrictions on a defendant's liberty that may be relevant to
an inquiry regarding "official confinement." As worded, the Fellhauerrule would
allow a court to examine only restrictions on the defendant's freedom of
movement. 26 While this is certainly one restriction on a defendant's liberty, it is by
no means the only one. For example, other relevant restrictions might include
impingement upon the defendant's freedom of association, freedom from state
supervision, and freedom of activity, or perhaps an imposition of a certain
regimented lifestyle on the defendant. All of these factors were considered by the
opinions of other jurisdictions studied by the Fellhauer court, 27 and all were
as evidenced by the court's quotation of these factors in
apparently influential,
28
People v. Ramos.
Precisely why the Fellhauerrule was worded to explicitly include only freedom
of movement is unclear. The court certainly seemed to be persuaded, especially by
the law of other jurisdictions, that freedom of movement was not the only measure
of the restrictions on a defendant's liberty. The court may have meant the term
"freedom of movement" to mean more than actual locomotion from point A to point
B, but the rule as worded leaves this open to debate. 129 Regardless of the reasons for

124. See Fellhauer, 123 N.M. at 481, 943 P.2d at 128.
125. See id. See also N.M. CRIM. FORMS 9-302 and 9-303 (1997).
126. See Fellhauer, 123 N.M. at 481, 943 P.2d at 128.
127. See id. at 479-80, 943 P.2d at 126-27.
128. 561 N.E.2d 643 (IM.1990).
129. In a personal interview, Judge Bustamante indicated that he felt that courts applying the Fellhauerrule
would construe "freedom of movement" in a broad sense, and that he certainly intended it to have a meaning
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this construction, the rule may have the unfortunate effect of unduly narrowing a
court's focus during its inquiry into the restrictions on a defendant's liberty.
In sum, it appears that the New Mexico Court of Appeals has produced a rule for
defining official confinement that is superfluous, because the test it created in
Fellhauercan never be met by any defendant incarcerated outside of a penal
institution. Moreover, even if existing law were changed to require an escape charge
provision in a release order, making the Fellhauerrule more workable, the rule
instructs courts to inquire too narrowly into the potential restrictions on a defendant's liberty in determining whether he was officially confined.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
Regardless of how the Fellhauerrule works in practice, it is likely to give rise
to a serious and problematic consequence. It has the potential of exacerbating
potentially illegal overcrowding at the Bernalillo County Detention Center (BCDC).
Before turning to the potential effect of Fellhaueron BCDC overcrowding, it is
helpful to begin with a brief factual history of the overcrowding at that facility.
BCDC is the primary detention facility for housing both accused and convicted
criminal offenders within Bernalillo County.13 BCDC is owned by the county of
Bernalillo but operated by the City of Albuquerque. In 1994, BCDC inmates filed
a class action lawsuit against the city, alleging that gross overcrowding at BCDC
violated their constitutional rights.' 3 ' At the time the lawsuit was filed, the average
daily population of BCDC was 1000 inmates, a staggering figure when one realizes
that the facility was originally designed to house a maximum of 550 prisoners. 32 In
October 1996, the lawsuit was settled by an agreement that contained a provision
capping the BCDC inmate population at 700 and providing for a series of gradual
cap reductions. 33 A134federal court judge approved this settlement, giving it the force
of a judicial order.
Since then, Albuquerque has struggled with inadequate facilities and finances to
meet these population caps through various methods, including the construction of
35
an additional correctional facility and a temporary tent city for inmates.
Additionally, in a politically suicidal move, Albuquerque released36 prisoners before
the terms of their sentences ended or without sentencing at all.'
The practical effect of the Fellhauerdecision will not make the city's job any
easier. Prisoners under house arrest will not receive credit against their sentences,
and, consequently, will spend more time incarcerated in BCDC. As an example, a
beyond physical movement. Interview with Michael Bustamante, Judge for the New Mexico Court of Appeals, in
Albuquerque, N.M. (Oct. 21, 1997). However, this cannot be discerned simply from reading the Fellhauer opinion,
and it may not have been the intent of either Judge Bosson or Judge Armijo.
130. See Dennis Domrzalski, Settlement Caps Jail Population at 700, ALBUQ. TRI., Oct. 30, 1996, at A3.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See Jail Expects to Meet Inmate Limit, ALBUQ. J., June 3, 1997, at C2. On June 1, 1997, the population
cap dropped to 643. See id.
134. See Domrzalski, supra note 130.
135. See Tim Archuleta & Dennis Domrlalski, Let Inmates Live in Tents, City Suggests, ALBUQ. TRIB., Mar.
22, 1996, at Al.
136. See Frank Zoretich & Rory McClannahan, Judge Orders City Jail Tent Dismantled, ALBUQ. J., Mar.
25, 1996, at Al.
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criminal who spends three months under house arrest waiting for her trial and
receives a sentence of eight months in BCDC will actually spend eight months there
instead of five. Even if parole is factored in, the actual time of incarceration will be
significantly longer. Because the influx of new prisoners is not likely to slow,
BCDC will find itself with a glut of inmates that will threaten its compliance with
the population caps. This leaves Albuquerque with three no-win options: building
new, expensive facilities; enraging the public by releasing criminals early; or doing
nothing and facing more lawsuits for constitutional rights violations.
VII. CONCLUSION
In Fellhauer, the New Mexico Court of Appeals promulgated a rule for
determining "official confinement" for the purposes of granting presentence
confinement credit.' 37 Although the rule reflects a compromise between the
traditional fact-finding inquiries of New Mexico courts and the bright-line tests
adopted by other jurisdictions, it is superfluous and may unduly restrict a court's
inquiry into the particular facts of any given confinement.
Even though these deficiencies are correctable through subsequent litigation, the
passage of new legislation, and modification of release order rules, the immediate
likely effect of the Fellhauerdecision will be an exacerbation of the overcrowding
at the Bernalillo County Detention Center. This, in turn, will create a substantial
financial burden for Albuquerque. Other New Mexico cities that currently struggle
with the same problem of overcrowding will face similar difficulties.
BEN FEUCHTER

137. See State v. Fellhauer, 123 N.M. 476,481,943 P.2d 123, 128 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 123 N.M. 446,
942 P.2d 189 (1997).

